This paper analyzes the effect of labor and product market regulation in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium with search frictions. Modeling multiple-worker firms allows us to distinguish between the exit-and-entry (extensive) margin, and the hiring-and-firing (intensive) margin. We characterize analytically how both margins depend on regulation before we calibrate the model to the US economy. We find that firing costs matter most for the intensive margin. Fixed or set-up costs in the product market instead alter primarily the behavior of firms at the extensive margin. Moreover, we find important interactions between the policies through firm selection. Finally, the opposite effect of product and labor market regulation on job turnover rationalizes the empirically observed similarity of turnover rates across countries.
Introduction
Product and labor market regulations di¤er substantially across OECD countries. Whereas Anglo-Saxon countries have ‡exible labor markets and deregulated product markets, the opposite is the case for continental European countries. 1 Although substantial di¤erences remain, European product markets have undergone noticeable deregulation over recent years.
Conversely, reforms in the labor market have been marginal and mostly limited to the introduction of more ‡exible contracts. 2 This is why recent research has argued that interactions between labor and product market regulation might help to explain the di¤erent evolution of unemployment rates across European countries.
The coexistence of regulation in product and labor markets is a serious challenge for empirical researchers who are interested in the e¤ects of labor market institutions on economic performance. Considering each type of regulation independently is misleading if there are important channels of interaction since then the e¤ect of labor market institutions is confounded by changes in product market regulation. 3 Thus, it is important to understand the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects of both types of regulation in a uni…ed theoretical framework wherein product and labor market regulation each play a distinctive role but also interact endogenously by changing the costs and bene…ts of the respective other policy.
In this paper we set up such a model, focussing on empirically important parts of regulation, such as wasteful …ring costs 4 in labor markets and administrative …xed and set-up costs in product markets. Usual matching models are not well suited to analyze these types of regulation since entry and exit are indistinguishable from job creation and job destruction 1 The correlation coe¢ cient between summary indicators for the stringency of employment protection leg- 3 A recent illustration of this problem is in Lopez-Garcia (2003) . Using data with country and time variations, she …nds that the e¤ect of EPL on unemployment falls dramatically in size and signi…cance whenever start-up costs are included in the regressions. 4 In reality, transfers between …rms and workers are also an important component of employment protection legislation. For a recent discussion on the e¤ects of severance payments see Garibaldi and Violante (2005) .
1 because of the "one-…rm-one-worker"assumption. Instead we want to capture that barriers to entry limit the number of …rms whereas …ring costs in ‡uence …rms'employment decision.
Hence, we set up a model with multiple-worker …rms which explicitly allows us to distinguish between the exit-and-entry (extensive) margin, and the hiring-and-…ring (intensive) margin.
We characterize analytically how both margins depend on the regulation policies before we calibrate the model to the US economy.
We …nd that …ring costs primarily matter for adjustment at the intensive margin: incumbent …rms that are exposed to exogenous changes in business conditions will hoard more or less labor depending on the adjustment costs. Fixed or set-up costs in the product market instead alter primarily the behavior of …rms at the extensive entry margin and thus the total number of …rms producing in equilibrium. The model also allows us to highlight important interactions. On the one hand, …ring costs encourage exit for two reasons: …rstly, they lower the asset value of the …rm; secondly, they increase the incentive to declare bankruptcy since defaulting …rms are exempted from …ring costs. On the other hand, product market regulation matters for labor hoarding through a selection e¤ect: higher …xed and set-up costs imply higher average …rm productivity and larger average …rm size. Job turnover per …rm increases but since a smaller number of …rms produces in equilibrium, the aggregate steady-state mobility costs decrease.
Furthermore, we …nd that the interaction between …ring and set-up costs di¤ers across …rms. Incumbent …rms favor higher barriers to entry as they bene…t from the exclusion of less productive …rms. The congestion externality in the labor market is mitigated and this partially compensates for the burden of higher …ring costs. Nevertheless, for the welfare of the economy as a whole, low barriers to entry complement high …ring costs. The intuition is that lower set-up costs foster …rm creation and thus mitigate the higher incidence of …rm destruction due to …ring restrictions. As agents are risk neutral in our model, the insurance of workers by "larger"…rms is not valued and the existence of a subset of high-turnover …rms employing workers adds welfare.
Since heterogenous …rms decide whether to enter in the good state and can exit if a bad shock occurs, our model generates predictions about the patterns of …rm and job turnover in the steady state. In our numerical calibration we …nd that product and labor market 2 regulation have quite di¤erent and potentially countervailing e¤ects on …rm and job turnover.
Firing costs decrease job turnover but increase …rm turnover because more …rms exit in the bad state and default on …ring costs. On the contrary, the selection e¤ect of …xed and set-up costs intensi…es job turnover per …rm mostly because smaller search frictions decrease the recruitment costs.
These opposite e¤ects on job turnover provide an alternative explanation to Bertola and Rogerson (1997) for why job turnover is similar across developed countries with di¤erent stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL). Whereas Bertola and Rogerson argue that rigid wages complement strict EPL in developed countries, we argue that the similar job-turnover rates can be explained by more product market regulation (PMR) in countries with stricter EPL.
Related literature. The interactions between product and labor market regulations have received much interest in recent years. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) focus on the bargaining power of workers as labor market regulation. They argue that higher rents in regulated product markets are complementary with more bargaining power in the labor market since workers try to appropriate some of the rents. Ebell and Haefke (2004) have extended the model to a dynamic context determining the type of bargain (individual or collective) as a function of product market regulation. In this paper, we take the type of bargain as exogenous and instead focus on employment protection legislation, a labor market policy which is very important in many OECD countries and at the same time quite heterogenous across them. Compared with the deterministic models mentioned above, we frame our analysis in a stochastic environment in order to analyze …ring costs and turnover in a meaningful way.
We solve a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model with multiple-worker …rms and frictions in the labor market. Imperfect labor markets with frictions imply realistic equilibrium unemployment and allow for a potentially positive welfare e¤ect of market regulation. Although a dynamic model with multiple-worker …rms and well-de…ned …rm size is not easily solved, the distinction between administrative …xed and set-up costs per …rm and …ring costs per worker is most meaningful if multiple-worker …rms have an intensive and extensive margin.
5 5 For an analysis of hiring subsidies and …ring costs in one-worker …rms see Mortensen and Pissarides
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Our paper builds on the model of Bertola and Caballero (1994) , henceforth BC. We add an entry and exit decision to BC and maintain the assumption that workers are homogenous whereas …rms are heterogenous. In our model …rm heterogeneity also has a permanent component besides the standard stochastic component which ‡uctuates between two states, good and bad. Permanent productivity di¤erences between …rms allow us to determine two endogenous productivity thresholds: one above which …rms decide to enter in the good state and another one below which …rms exit in the bad state. 6 As in BC, …rm size is well de…ned because the production technology has decreasing returns to scale in labor and …rms cannot hire immediately due to frictions in the labor market. Since wages are permanently renegotiated, this gives rise to intra-…rm bargaining and overemployment. Firms exploit that an additional worker lowers the wage of all employed workers. This outcome of intra-…rm bargaining has been derived in deterministic models such as the partial equilibrium analyses of Stole and Zwiebel (1996 a,b), the equilibrium analysis of Smith (1999) and, with multiple types of workers and capital, Cahuc et al. (2004) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model.
We de…ne and calibrate the equilibrium to the US economy in Section 3. Section 4 provides a quantitative numerical analysis of the e¤ect of regulation. The interactions between the two types of regulation are detailed in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Model
In this section we set up the model and provide analytical results on the …rms'behavior.
(2003) and Pissarides (2000) , chapter 9. Since both policies a¤ect the intensive hiring and …ring margin in models with one-worker …rms, they have a similar e¤ect on the match surplus and hiring subsidies can be designed to o¤set the e¤ects of …ring costs. 6 This relates to the analysis of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) who analyze the e¤ect of …ring costs in a neoclassical model with job and …rm turnover in the steady state. In their calibration …ring costs have a substantial negative e¤ect on average productivity, employment and consumption. 4 
Set-up
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers. Workers are assumed to be homogenous and in…nitely-lived. They are employed by a continuum of …rms whose mass is endogenously determined in equilibrium by the entry and exit conditions. Firms are indexed by the subscript i so that i 2 [0; ]. Contrary to workers, …rms are heterogenous and di¤er with respect to their permanent total factor productivity a i and transitory di¤erences in business conditions. Both …rms and workers are risk neutral.
Technology. Each …rm has access to a production technology that uses labor as the only input. The production technology has a …xed overhead component f and a variable component. The variable component has decreasing returns to scale. The …rm's labor-demand schedule is characterized using a linearization of the marginal revenues where the superscript denotes whether the …rm is in the good or bad transitory state. We assume that @ =@a i > 0, @ =@" j > 0 with " g > " b . The permanent components a i are distributed according to an exogenous density over the interval [0; a]. Hence their total mass is constant through time so that new a i cannot be created. In the remainder of the text, we will refer to a i as "production opportunities". In equilibrium, some production opportunities will be exploited by operating …rms whereas others will be left unused. For concreteness, we assume that
The production technology implies that each …rm has decreasing returns in employing workers. Thus, …rm size is a well-de…ned concept and allows us to analyze the e¤ect of …ring costs and product market regulation for …rms with multiple workers.
Institutions. Behavior in our economy is constrained by institutions in both the product and labor market. In the labor market, wasteful …ring costs F constrain …rms'layo¤ deci-sions. In the product market, …rms face a regulatory burden. They have to pay a wasteful ‡ow cost f in order to comply with regulation on licensing and other bureaucratic burden.
We think of f as capturing the administrative procedures and economic regulations that impede …rms in each period in which they produce. In reality, barriers to entrepreneurial activity also account for a signi…cant part of product market regulation (see Nicoletti et al. 1999 ). We model this constraint by assuming that …rms face a cost of entry equal to C.
The labor market. The labor market is characterized by search frictions as in the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model. We consider a Cobb-Douglas matching technology with constant returns so that every vacancy is matched to an unemployed worker at
Poisson rate
where t V t =U t , V t denotes the stock of vacancies at time t, U t denotes the stock of unemployed workers and is the scaling factor of the matching function.
The hiring process consumes time and resources. As in BC, open vacancies v it entail a ‡ow cost cv 2 it =2 so that the marginal cost is cv it and the number of posted vacancies is bounded.
Firm behavior
Our analysis focuses on the steady state so that time indices are dropped unless necessary.
We …rst de…ne the asset values of …rms that always remain in the market and of …rms that enter and exit. In the remainder of the paper we will refer to the former as "labor-hoarding …rms"and to the latter as "non-permanent …rms". Deriving these asset values is one of the main innovations of this paper compared with BC so that we analyze them in some detail.
Then we use these asset values to determine …rm selection.
Firms that exit the market declare bankruptcy, …re all workers and default on the …ring costs. 7 We de…ne the asset value of a …rm i in the bad and good state as A b;n i and A g;n i , 7 This assumption is similar to Belviso (2005) . However, in our model with heterogenous …rms, it is optimal that not all …rms avoid …ring costs by declaring bankruptcy but only "small"…rms choose to default on …ring costs if they are hit by a bad shock.
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where n is a discrete variable which takes value 0 when …rm i declares bankruptcy in the bad state and 1 otherwise. We also apply superscripts 1 or 0 to the state and control variables.
The asset value of a …rm in the good state A 
, where is the Poisson hazard of receiving a good shock and
The asset value is rather standard as it includes the pro…t ‡ow Because hiring frictions make it impossible to adjust labor immediately to its optimal level, employment in the bad state equals employment of a …rm that has just received a good shock and has spent = 0 time units in the good state. Firms post vacancies solely in the good state and the asset value of …rm i in the good state reads
where is the Poisson hazard of receiving a bad shock and
The pro…t ‡ows in the good state include the ‡ow costs of vacancy posting cv 
where a dot denotes a derivative with respect to time spent in the good state. Inserting this expression for expected capital gains into the asset equation (1) allows us to rewrite it as a function of the optimal labor demand schedule
where we substitute _ l
i ( ) using the assumptions on the matching technology.
Asset values: non-permanent …rms. We now characterize the asset values of a …rm i that declares bankruptcy if hit by a bad shock. We assume that the "ownership" of the production opportunity a i is lost after …ling for bankruptcy. In other words, managers who declare bankruptcy do not retain the option to exploit the production opportunity when business conditions switch back to the good state. 9 Managers operate in a perfectly competitive environment, so their outside option is equal to zero 9 Alternatively, one could interpret a i as measuring managers'abilities. Then the production opportunities are retained after …ling for bankruptcy. This interpretation has the interesting implication that entry costs deter …rms from going bankrupt. However, calibrating the model shows that this e¤ect is very small because of discounting. Since this assumption complicates the analysis, we …nd it more parsimonious and instructive to focus on the interpretation proposed in the main text. 10 This holds if the supply of managers for pro…table production opportunities is perfectly elastic. We view this as a …rst approximation and leave the task of explicitly endogenizing the market for managers to further research.
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Bankruptcy is an attractive option because: (i) it allows to save on wages and …xed costs in the bad state; (ii) bankrupt …rms default on …ring costs. Thus, the asset equation in the good state is given by
where 0 has been substituted for the asset value in the bad state.
Extensive margin and …rm selection.
Exit rule. In steady-state some …rms will decide to hoard labor while others will prefer to exit the market. The asset values derived in the previous section allow us to determine the permanent productivity threshold below which …rms decide to exit the market. We solve the problem in a recursive way: the …rm determines whether or not it will exit the market in the bad state, then it decides upon its optimal labor demand schedule.
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As the asset value A b;1 (a i ) is increasing in a i whereas the bankruptcy option A b;0 is independent of a i , there exists a threshold productivity a such that
The …rms with a permanent productivity below a are always better o¤ in the bad state by declaring bankruptcy. Using the asset equations above, we determine a with the equation
It remains to pin down A g;1 i ( = 0) for the marginal …rm. Using A b;1 (a ) = 0 and inserting the analytic expression for the pro…t ‡ow, the asset value of the marginal …rm in the good state can be rewritten as follows
11 In order to rule out inconsistent choice, we notice that the exit decision is based on the value of the …rm in the bad state so that …rms necessarily choose the alternative which yields the highest asset value when
In other terms, the …rm's value in the good state may be higher if it could commit to hoard labor in the bad state, but it will never implement this production plan if it does better in the bad state by declaring bankruptcy.
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Optimal vacancy posting implies that
As in BC, the marginal value of employment is equal to the expected hiring costs. Inserting this expression in the previous asset equation, we obtain
This equation enables us to evaluate the entry condition (2) to solve for a using the optimal labor demand schedules derived below. Let us mention for future reference that …ring costs F decrease the asset values and thus increase the productivity of …rms that produce in equilibrium through the entry and exit decision. However, their e¤ect is less direct than that of …xed costs f , since …ring costs do not enter explicitly in equation (3).
Firing restrictions only matter through their e¤ect on the vacancy-posting policy v 1 (a ; 0) and hoarded labor l 1 (a ; 0). This is due to the fact that the …rm will have to pay …ring costs solely in the distant future, when it will switch back from the good to the bad state.
Entry rule. We restrict our attention to the steady-state of the economy. In equilibrium, all the production opportunities above a are exploited and remain …lled independently of their idiosyncratic business conditions. Since the mass and distribution of production opportunities remain constant, the only vacant production opportunities are below a . Let a denote the lowest permanent productivity among …rms which enter the market in the good state and exit in the bad state. The entry condition that determines a reads
where C is the entry cost. As before, optimality implies that the derivative of the asset value with respect to labor is equal to cv 0 (a ; 0)=q( ). Moreover, since l 0 (a ; 0) = 0, we
f . Replacing these two expressions in the asset equation
and simplifying yields
Since v 0 (a; 0) is increasing in a, the entry condition A g;0 (a ; 0) = C is equivalent to …nding a permanent productivity a such that
Note again that product market regulation (C; f ) directly a¤ects a whereas …ring costs F only matter by changing the vacancy posting of …rms, that is the function v 0 ( ). Depending on the model's parameters (especially C), a might be larger than a . Then, there is no …rm turnover. In most cases the equilibrium is characterized by the following cross-sectional distribution: the production opportunities below a are vacant, those between a and a are exploited in the good state and left unused in the bad state, while production opportunities above a remain …lled by labor-hoarding …rms.
Intensive margin: hiring and …ring.
We brie ‡y mention how …rms adjust at the intensive margin. This section is quite similar to BC but for the fact that …rms di¤er with respect to their permanent productivity shifter a i and that some …rms do not hoard labor in the bad state.
Search frictions in the labor market imply that hiring takes time so that …rms cannot immediately adjust their stock of employed workers upwards. Instead, …ring of workers is immediate. The stock of employed workers at …rm i evolves according to
where the …rm i sheds l it workers if hit by a negative shock. Dropping time indexes, the shadow value of employment reads
where ! n i (l n (a i ; ); a i ) denotes the marginal cost of employment. Note that this marginal cost is not equal to the wage in our model since multiple-worker …rms have monopsony power and take into account the e¤ect of their marginal employment decision on the wages of all workers.
Labor demand schedule of "non-permanent" …rms. The shadow value of an additional worker in the bad state depends on whether or not the …rm declares bankruptcy.
If a i < a , so that a …rm exits the market when hit by a bad shock, the shadow value is obviously equal to zero
In the good state the …rms decide to hire so that the shadow value equals the expected hiring cost
Using the linearization of the revenue function, we …nd that
Given that bankrupt …rms default on …ring costs, their optimal labor demand schedule is independent of F . This means that the entry rule (4) is not directly a¤ected by the stringency of EPL. There will be an equilibrium e¤ect, however, as we will see in the numerical solution below.
Labor demand schedule of "labor-hoarding"…rms. If a i a , …rm i decides to both …re and hoard labor when hit by a bad shock. Then, the shadow value of an additional worker must be equal to the …ring cost
The shadow value in the good state is determined as before, so that
Since …ring is instantaneous, each …rm that …res has the same employment level conditional on permanent productivity a i . The employment of …rms in the good state depends on how long …rms have been in the good state. Using the linearization of the revenue function and the …ring condition, we …nd that …ring in the bad state is determined by
and hiring in the good state at time is given by
Contrary to the conditions for the extensive margin (2) ; (3) and (4) the conditions for the intensive margin (8) and (9) explicitly depend on …ring costs F whereas …xed costs f or set-up costs C only have an implicit e¤ect. Although higher …xed or set-up costs do not a¤ect the optimal labor demand schedule of a given …rm directly, they modify the distribution of operating …rms through the selection e¤ect at the extensive margin. As only more productive …rms enter a more regulated market and the hiring and …ring condition depend on a i , …xed and set-up costs matter for aggregate labor hoarding. The selection e¤ect also induces an equilibrium e¤ect by feeding back into the optimal recruitment policy, and thus changes the aggregate unemployment rate and labor market tightness. We will illustrate this interaction further when we solve the model numerically in the next section.
The asset value of the worker, wages and the equilibrium are solved for quite similarly to BC so that we refer for these derivations to the Appendix. The model can be solved largely analytically but for the two conditions that determine hoarded labor, l 
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In this section we de…ne the equilibrium, describe the numerical algorithm and calibrate our model to the US economy. Then we discuss the robustness of the calibration to some changes of important parameters.
Equilibrium de…nition. We de…ne a search equilibrium for the economy as a set of aggregate quantities fL; V g, matching rate q( ), permanent productivity thresholds fa ; a g, employment distribution (lja i ) and in…nite sequences for quantities fl such that:
Given the matching rate and prices, fl
are the solution of the Nash-bargaining problem.
Permanent productivity thresholds fa ; a g are determined by the optimal entry and exit decisions of …rms.
Aggregate quantities fL; V g result from the aggregation of …rms'optimal labor demand schedules.
The matching rate q( ) is given by the aggregate matching function.
The ‡ows into and out of the employment distribution (lja i ) balance out.
The derivation of the equilibrium can be found in the Appendix.
Cross-sectional e¢ ciency. As already mentioned by BC, solving the social planner's problem makes clear that the decentralized equilibrium is not e¢ cient because of the standard congestion externality. Because of intra-…rm bargaining distortions and …rm heterogeneity, the standard Hosios condition is not enough to restore e¢ ciency. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is important to note that the congestion externalities are rather unimportant for the parameter values of the calibrated model described below. 14 The numerical algorithm. The algorithm proceeds in three steps. In Step 1, we set starting values for the average number of vacancies, labor market tightness and the productivity a of the marginal …rm. In Step 2, we solve for v 1 (a ; 0), l 1 (a ; 0) and use the solution for v 0 (a ; 0) to determine a . We then update the average number of vacancies and . As long as these two values have not converged up to numerical precision of 10 6 , we repeat Step 2. Otherwise we continue with Step 3 and update a using the steady-state condition A b;1 (a ) = 0. Unless a has converged up to numerical precision of 10 6 , we update and the average number of vacancies, and restart the algorithm at Step 2. Our numerical results indicate that the equilibrium labor market tightness is locally unique.
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Calibration. For our computations we assume that production opportunities are uniformly distributed so that a i U (0; a). The constant density facilitates the interpretation of the numerical results. The upper bound of the uniform distribution can be tied down using the normalization to 1 of total labor in the frictionless economy. 16 We set the annual interest rate r to 0:05. The utility ‡ow in unemployment b = 0:05, which is 43% of the average wage in the ‡exible economy as we will see below. This value is within the range of commonly assumed values. We check that the value b implies that workers in the frictionless economy …nd it optimal to supply labor in the good state so that
, for all a i . Indeed, we …nd that for = 0:4 and " g = 1 this condition is always 15 We calculate the slope of the feedback locus 0 ( ) when we compute (in each iteration for each given value of a ). In the program we check that the locus 0 ( ) intersects only once with the 45-degree line. We have always found a unique equilibrium for positive given the parameter values we considered. 16 We restrict our attention to the case where …rms in the frictionless economy operate solely in the good state. All labor is shed if a bad shock occurs. Since the workforce in the good state is equal to l(a) = a"g b , the normalization of employment to full employment in the frictionless economy yields
Setting a= 0 implies that a is the positive root of a quadratic equation
satis…ed in equilibrium. We set " b equal to b=a. This value implies that in the bad state there is no wage for which …rms employ a positive amount of labor in the frictionless economy.
The dynamic transitions between good and bad states are parametrized as = 0:5 and = 1. This implies that a created job has a 60% chance to persist for one year or more whereas the chance for a destroyed job is 40%. The former is consistent with estimates reported in Davis et al. (1996) whereas is higher than suggested by their evidence. A higher makes it more attractive for …rms to hoard labor also at low levels of unemployment. We need this for technical reasons as further explained below. We assume a matching e¢ ciency to match a reasonable unemployment rate, labor market tightness and thus unemployment duration. The value of c equals 1/12 of the average wage, which yields an average recruiting cost close to one month's wage (see Hamermesh, 1993) . As we will discuss further below, the small value of c is crucial for the model to predict realistic unemployment duration. The scaling factor instead allows for realistic unemployment rates.
In the calibration of our model there is a tension between targeting low unemployment rates and unemployment duration together with all …rms with a i a hoarding labor. The latter is important because it simpli…es the solution of the model since the shadow value of labor in the bad state is then determined by (8) . However, we need small search frictions in the labor market which imply realistic values for the level and duration of unemployment but also less labor hoarding. In order to generate some labor hoarding for all …rms with a i a , we calibrate …xed and …ring costs in the ‡exible economy as f = 0:1 and F = 0:04. This is not unrealistic compared with an average wage of 0:12 since even in relatively ‡exible 17 Note that e¢ ciency could not be restored in this model if we set = , as the Hosios condition might suggest. As pointed out in BC, cross-sectional e¢ ciency is more di¢ cult to achieve because of the additional Table 1 : Equilibrium values in the ‡exible "US"economy.
economies such as the US, …rms face some administrative costs to maintain operations and lay o¤ workers if these lay-o¤s are considered "unfair" (see OECD, Ch. 2, 1999; Autor, Donohue and Schwab, 2006). Our calibration implies that the …rm with a i = a just hoards a tiny amount of labor l i (0) in the bad state. We calibrate set-up costs C = 0:1 so that the hazard rate of bankruptcy is equal to 0.8% per year, which is realistic for publicly traded …rms in the US economy (see www.bankruptcydata.com). Table 1 
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For the assumed uniform distribution, the average …rm size reported in Table 1 can be computed as total employment over the mass of producing …rms. This measure equals 1 if there is full employment and all production opportunities are exploited. In our calibration the average size is 1:49 which results because of deviations on the intensive and extensive margin from this benchmark. The amount of average labor hoarded is 0:19, that is 1=7 of the average …rm size. Finally, the output measure in Table 1 is de…ned net of steady-state mobility and vacancy costs. We then subtract …xed costs of all producing …rms and take into account the utility ‡ow of the unemployed for our measure of welfare (see the Appendix for the analytic expressions).
Robustness. Before analyzing changes in the policy parameters (f; C; F ), let us mention how the equilibrium depends on some important parameter values. 19 For brevity we only summarize the main insights. A higher utility during unemployment b = 0:06 or a bargaining power of workers = 0:3 both increase unemployment and unemployment duration. However, has a stronger selection e¤ect than b: less …rms operate in equilibrium and average productivity increases. Decreasing , and so reducing the elasticity of the …rms'marginal revenue with respect to employment, augments the number of posted vacancies, the average …rm size and the amount of labor hoarded. As a result, the unemployment rate and duration fall substantially. 20 A slightly smaller ‡ow cost of vacancy posting c = 0:0095 also substantially lowers the unemployment rate and duration. The lower cost of posting vacancies favors …rms with a high permanent productivity a i since they tend to post more vacancies. Thus more production opportunities are vacant, i.e., a and a increase slightly. Firms have a larger average size and hoard less labor in the bad state since hiring is less costly. Both a 18 Our model produces a left-skewed cross-sectional distribution for wages and a U-shaped distribution of employment over …rms with di¤erent size which are roughly consistent with empirical data. Our model also generates a positive …rm-size wage premium and smaller wage dispersion in larger …rms as in Bertola and Garibaldi (2001) . Results on the cross-sectional distribution are available on request. 19 We keep constant the other parameters which depend on or b (e.g. a). More detailed numerical results are available on request. 20 This is similar to Smith (1999) who showed that more overemployment resulting from concave production exacerbates the congestion externality and thus reduces entry and aggregate employment.
smaller c or imply that regulation has a smaller e¤ect on the unemployment rate.
Many papers have argued that the volatility of the economic environment is substantially higher today than it used to be in the 1960 and 1970s (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998 , and their references). Whereas Ljungqvist and Sargent argue that the size of the shock has increased, we augment the frequency of the turbulence by setting = 0:7 and = 1:4 so that created jobs have 50% chance to persist more than a year whereas destroyed jobs only persist more than a year with 25% probability. These parameter changes leave the steadystate probability mass in the bad state unchanged at =( + ) = 1=3, but decrease the persistence of each state.
Not surprisingly, turbulence increases frictional unemployment. Nevertheless, the unemployment duration decreases because more vacancies are posted. Higher steady-state mobility costs reduce output and welfare. More interestingly, higher turbulence implies that a and a increase, so that only …rms with higher permanent productivity continue to produce.
Since …rms that only operate in the good state produce for a shorter expected duration, a increases more than a and the incidence of bankruptcy decreases. Average …rm size is slightly lower as …rms in the good state converge to smaller employment levels l i ( ! 1).
Finally, more labor is hoarded in the bad state so that wages are lower on average. The e¤ect of turbulence on labor hoarding is very intuitive: if a bad shock is less persistent, …rms will …nd it less attractive to lay o¤ workers even if …ring costs are low. Firms hoard labor to avoid labor market frictions whereas …ring costs are much less relevant for labor hoarding in an economy with high turbulence: the implied elasticity of labor hoarding with respect to …ring costs falls.
In the following sections we analyze the e¤ect of regulation on the equilibrium. We start by presenting results on the e¤ect of …xed, entry and …ring costs in Section 4 before we characterize the interactions between regulations in Section 5.
The e¤ect of regulation
The selection e¤ect of …xed costs. As can be seen from equations (A13) ; (A14) and (A15) in the Appendix, the …xed costs f do not directly enter in the optimal labor demand Table 2 : Equilibrium values for di¤erent …xed costs and set-up costs.
schedules. Since vacancy posting and labor hoarding decisions are based on workers'marginal revenues, it is clear that …xed costs do not in ‡uence the decisions of …rms at the intensive margin.
Fixed costs, however, reduce …rms'asset values. As the least pro…table …rm just breaks even, it is driven out of business by a tightening of administrative regulation. In terms of the model's parameters this means that a and a increase, as can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (2) or (3) and (4) in Table 2 , where we increase …xed costs from 0.1 to 0.15 (for di¤erent levels of set-up cost C). Furthermore, the impact on a is stronger so that …xed costs increase the size of the interval [a ; a ] in which …rms declare bankruptcy. Given that non-permanent …rms do not pay the …xed costs in the bad state, their asset values fall relatively less than the asset values of the labor hoarding …rms. Quantitatively, for low set-up costs C = 0:1, higher …xed costs imply that the incidence of bankruptcy increases from 0.8% to 2%.
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This selection e¤ect on a and a decreases labor market tightness and thus reduces wages by lowering the outside option of workers. The operating …rms take advantage of their stronger bargaining position through an increase in both hoarded labor and targeted employment in the good state l i ( ! 1). The new equilibrium is characterized by a smaller number of larger …rms. Notice that labor hoarding remains nearly constant so that most of the adjustment is achieved through an increase of the …rms' sizes in the good state.
This implies that …rms destroy on average more jobs when they are hit by a bad shock.
This positive turnover e¤ect on labor hoarding …rms is reinforced by the fact that a larger share of …rms declares bankruptcy and sheds all workers. Although the e¤ect on …rm size compensates the selection e¤ect to a certain extent, the latter prevails so that labor market tightness decreases and unemployment increases substantially.
The selection e¤ect of barriers to entry. Table 2 also displays the equilibrium outcomes for higher set-up costs C = 0:15, again for di¤erent levels of …xed costs. Not surprisingly, higher barriers to entry decrease the number of operating …rms and slightly increase average productivity and average …rms'size. The increase in unemployment and unemployment duration leads to a decline in wages. Set-up costs also decrease welfare and output.
These negative e¤ects are quantitatively smaller than for …xed costs because the set-up costs do not directly a¤ect the asset value of the …rm once it has entered the market. 21 More interestingly, barriers to entry have opposite e¤ects on the exit and entry margins:
they lower a and raise a , so that less …rms declare bankruptcy in the bad state. On the one hand, more production opportunities are exploited in the bad state because the barriers to entry isolate operating …rms from the competition of potential entrants. As set-up costs do not a¤ect their revenues, the labor hoarding …rms actually bene…t from an increase in C.
On the other hand, less …rms are created due to the higher cost of entry. This e¤ect on a is more sizeable and positive as can be seen analytically from the entry rule (4) . Column (3) shows that set-up costs can deter entry to such an extent that a > a . In other terms, for su¢ ciently high set-up costs, the equilibrium may exhibit no bankruptcy and no …rm turnover. 21 The negative welfare e¤ect remains if …xed and/or set-up costs are rebated at the aggregate level. The interactions between …xed costs and entry costs. Comparing the unemployment rates reported in Table 2 shows that the two regulations interact negatively since their joint increase (see column (4)) leads to bigger job losses than the sum of their independent increases (see columns (2) and (3)). Intuitively, the selection e¤ect is reinforced as the two regulations increase the costs and reduce the pro…ts of exploiting vacant production opportunities.
The e¤ect of EPL. The mechanism through which EPL a¤ects the equilibrium is more intricate because …ring costs also directly modify the labor demand schedules of …rms. As explained in Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , the partial equilibrium e¤ect of …ring costs yields less labor mobility and more labor hoarding. Firms respond to the change in labor market tightness by adjusting the number of posted vacancies. This equilibrium e¤ect dampens the imbalance between the partial equilibrium e¤ects on the hiring and …ring margins. To the extent that the labor hoarding adjustments prevail, …ring costs and employment are positively related in equilibrium.
Both partial equilibrium and equilibrium e¤ects were already at work in BC. Since our model has an extensive adjustment margin, …ring costs also have an additional selection e¤ect. Table 3 decomposes the e¤ect of …ring costs into: (i) the partial equilibrium e¤ect (for given a , a and ), (ii) the equilibrium e¤ect through changes in for given a and a , (iii) the selection e¤ect on a and a . The table analyzes the e¤ect of increasing …ring cost F from 0:04 to 0:09 for …xed and set-up cost f = C = 0:1.
Column (2) displays the partial equilibrium e¤ect of higher …ring cost. As expected, employment protection stimulates labor hoarding and the average …rm's size increases. Hence, positive labor adjustments at the …ring margin prevail over negative adjustments at the hiring margin. This is why the partial equilibrium e¤ect on employment is positive. The fourth row displays the new labor market tightness. As the number of unemployed and posted vacancies decrease, the labor market becomes tighter. Obviously, the value of reported in column (2) is not an equilibrium outcome since we assume that …rms make their choice based on the value of in column (1). The equilibrium adjustments resulting from the discrepancy between the two values of are reported in column (3). As explained before, a higher labor market tightness induces …rms to lower their labor demand, so that both labor hoarding and vacancy posting decrease. The equilibrium e¤ect of …ring costs on unemployment is positive and the equilibrium labor market tightness is substantially lower.
Of most interest to our analysis are the di¤erences between columns (3) and (4) since they capture the selection e¤ect that is new in our model. Although the selection e¤ect of …xed and …ring costs on a are qualitatively alike, their magnitude substantially di¤ers. 22 Given that the decision to remain in the market is based on the asset value of the …rm in the bad state, …ring costs are heavily discounted since they will have to be paid in the remote future. Instead, …xed costs burden the pro…t of the …rm at each instant so that they have a more noticeable in ‡uence on the extensive margin.
Conversely, the selection e¤ect of …xed and …ring costs on a are di¤erent in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Whereas …xed costs substantially increase a , the impact of …ring costs is negative and quantitatively small. The reason is that "non-permanent" …rms are exempted from EPL. Hence, …ring costs do not a¤ect directly their asset values A g;0 i (0). Instead, "labor hoarding" …rms (a i > a ) are hurt by …ring restrictions and thus post less vacancies in the good state. Ceteris paribus, the "non-permanent"…rms (a i 2 [a ; a ]) bene…t from the increase in the rate of vacancy …lling. This externality augments the incentives to enter the labor market in the good state so that a falls. 23 Turning our attention to employment, we notice that the selection e¤ect is positive. The sign of the relationship is due to the decrease in a and so crucially hinges on the assumption that …rms can declare bankruptcy. On the contrary, when the model does not allow …rms to declare bankruptcy, the selection e¤ect unambiguously raises unemployment. Thus, the sign and size of the selection e¤ect on unemployment depends importantly on whether small …rms (with low permanent productivity a i ) can "avoid"…ring costs using the bankruptcy option.
This motivates why, in countries with strict EPL like Italy or Germany, this legislation does not apply to small …rms with employment below a certain threshold. 24 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the sign of the relationship between EPL and unemployment is ambiguous. Depending on the parameter values, it can be either positive or negative. Nevertheless, doing comparative statics around the proposed equilibrium we have found that the e¤ects are locally robust.
Interaction of labor and product market regulation
We now investigate the interactions between labor and product market regulation. We …rst compare the welfare in steady states with di¤erent labor and product market regulation.
Although steady-state comparisons neglect transition dynamics, this exercise o¤ers …rst insights on how the regulations interact. Then we illustrate how the interactions analyzed by our model are important for applied researchers who try to isolate the e¤ect of labor market regulation on job ‡ows. We show how …ring and …xed costs have opposite e¤ects on job turnover which calls for a joint analysis of regulation in empirical work.
Complements or substitutes?
An important question is whether labor and product market regulation are complements or substitutes in terms of welfare. In this section we investigate whether the e¤ect of …xed costs or set-up costs changes for di¤erent levels of …ring costs. Table 4 : Changes in …xed or set-up costs for higher …ring costs.
Fixed costs and …ring costs. Before analyzing the interaction between …xed and …ring costs, it is useful to notice that their e¤ects would be independent in BC's framework. The interaction between both regulations arises because of the adjustments at the extensive margin. According to the previous sections, the selection e¤ects of …xed costs and employment protection are qualitatively similar: they both reduce the number of operating …rms in the bad state, increase …rm turnover and average …rm size. Quantitatively, …ring costs are more important for labor hoarding whereas …xed costs have a larger e¤ect on entry and exit.
We will show in section 5.2 that …xed costs increase the job turnover rate and thus the steady-state mobility cost per …rm. But this does not necessarily induce additional welfare losses because the impact of both policies on …rm selection implies that less …rms need to pay the …xed costs or …ring costs. This pure accounting e¤ect reduces, and can even outweigh, the direct negative impact on welfare. Adding the change in welfare between Table 2 , columns
(1) and (2) , and the change between Table 2 , column (1), and Table 4 , column (1), it appears that the welfare losses due to independent increases in …ring and …xed costs add up to 16:2% of the initial welfare. When regulations in both product and labor markets are combined, the welfare losses decrease to 15:8% (compare Table 2 , column (1), and Table 4 , column (2)).
Hence, the coexistence of the two regulations slightly alleviates their individual costs.
In order to understand the reason for this complementarity better, we further decompose the total losses into changes in the aggregate cost of vacancy posting, steady-state mobility costs and …xed costs. We …nd that both …ring and …xed costs reduce the cost of vacancy posting although this e¤ect is minor since the absolute level of this cost is low for the chosen small parameter value of c. Most importantly, we …nd that steady-state mobility costs decrease by 3.2% if …xed costs increase from 0:1 to 0:15 (as in Table 2 , columns (1) and (2)).
Although the mobility costs per …rm increase because of higher job turnover, the mass of …rms who bears these costs is smaller and the latter e¤ect dominates. Finally, the selection e¤ect implies that higher …ring costs increase the direct welfare losses resulting from …xed and set-up cost payments by 0:5% (for changes from Table 2 , column (1), to Table 4 , column (1)).
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Set-up costs and …ring costs. From the point of view of the …rm, defaulting is an alternative to paying the …ring costs. Therefore EPL makes bankruptcy a more attractive option. For example, comparing column (1) in Table 4 to column (1) in Table 2 shows that the incidence of bankruptcy goes up from 0:8% to 1:8% in the economy with stringent EPL.
But for this option to be relevant in equilibrium, set-up costs have to be low enough to allow …rms to enter the market. Hence low barriers to entry complement stringent EPL.
The results in Tables 2 and 4 illustrate this complementarity. Reducing entry costs from 0:15 to 0:1 implies a 3:1% decrease of the unemployment rate when …ring costs are low (see Table 2 , columns (1) and (3)), compared with 5:3% when …ring costs are high (see Table   25 For f = C = 0:1, the saved …xed costs of bankrupt …rms exactly cancel the additional set-up costs of newly entering …rms for given a . Since a falls slightly, more …rms pay the set-up cost so that the welfare loss increases.
Note also that if we rebate …ring cost at the aggregate level, output still decreases with higher …ring costs since bankrupt …rms do not produce in the bad state (the selection e¤ect on a and a ) and labor hoarding implies lower e¢ ciency for all operating …rms. The welfare gain because of lower steady-state vacancy costs is too small to o¤set these e¤ects.
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4, columns (1) and (3)). The higher rate of …rm creation induced by low barriers to entry mitigates the higher incidence of …rm destruction due to …ring restrictions.
Note however, that incumbent …rms like set-up cost. The fact that they make more pro…ts is illustrated by the observation that higher set-up costs lower a . As mentioned above barriers to entry isolate operating …rms from the competition of potential entrants.
Thus, these …rms can bear the …ring costs "more easily". This is interesting since it points to one reason for the coexistence of both types of regulation which is beyond our model in which agents are risk-neutral and …nancial markets are perfect. If …rms are supposed to insure workers by hoarding them in bad times, they can only do so if they remain pro…table.
Product market regulation generates these pro…ts and thus makes it easier for …rms to agree to policies that protect jobs in bad times.
Job turnover and interactions between …ring and …xed costs
We have already mentioned that higher …xed and/or set-up costs increase job turnover per …rm. As the competition for workers is alleviated by the selection e¤ect, the costs of adjusting the labor force decrease. Thus …rms have less incentive to smooth out their labor demand schedule. Conversely, it is well known that …ring costs imply less labor mobility at both the aggregate and …rm level. These insights are illustrated in Table 5 . The table reports the rate of job …nding, the aggregate job ‡ows 26 along with the rates of job turnover and job turnover per …rm. Table 5 shows that …xed costs decrease whereas …ring costs increase the job …nding rate. Firing costs do reduce job ‡ows because of the lower unemployment rate. Fixed costs have almost no e¤ect on aggregate job ‡ows as the smaller transition rate is compensated by the increase in the size of the unemployment pool. Since the ‡ows out of the employment pool are nearly constant whereas the number of employees is smaller, it follows that the job turnover rate is an increasing function of …xed costs. The job turnover rate per …rm is also 26 Notice that job ‡ows and worker ‡ows are indistinguishable in the current formulation of the model since we have excluded job-to-job transitions. Moreover, the job turnover rates are slightly higher than the empirical counterparts reported for the US (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999 , Table 2 ). This is because we assume larger values for in our calibration than in the data to ensure that …rms with a i > a are always at the …ring margin in the bad state (see the discussion of the calibration in Section 3). Table 5 : The e¤ect of …ring and …xed costs on turnover.
increasing for the same reasons, but in this case the e¤ect of …xed costs is strong enough so as to completely o¤set the "sclerosis"generated by EPL. The impact of set-up costs on the job turnover rate per …rm is similar but smaller. Yet, their e¤ect on job turnover is ambiguous in general because set-up costs also reduce the number of "non-permanent"…rms.
The implication of the model that product and labor market regulation have opposite e¤ects on job turnover is a priori consistent with empirical evidence that turnover rates across countries are very loosely related to the stringency of EPL. This empirical fact has led Bertola and Rogerson (1997) to argue that the greater compression of wages in Europe than in the US can compensate the di¤erences in EPL and so explain the similarity of the turnover rates. The model proposed in this paper suggests that more product market regulation in
Europe is an alternative explanation. In the light of Table 5 , the lack of conclusive evidence might be partly explained by the countervailing e¤ects of EPL and PMR.
27 27 Preliminary empirical results provide weak support for this prediction of the model. We regress job turnover statistics taken from the OECD Employment Outlook 1996 on cross-country indexes for both types of regulations (Nicoletti et al., 1999) . Considered separately, the EPL and PMR indexes are not signi…cant at all and have a negative coe¢ cient. When both EPL and PMR indicators are included as regressors, the explanatory power of the regression increases. Moreover, the coe¢ cients have the desired negative sign for EPL and positive sign for PMR. Nevertheless, both variables remain non-signi…cant at conventional levels.
The small sample size, the stylized nature of the indexes and, most importantly, the fact that the indexes are nearly collinear probably explain the lack of conclusive evidence. Thus, although a preliminary look at the data does not contradict the model's prediction, further empirical research is needed in order to ascertain 28 
Conclusions
The model analyzed in this paper extends the framework proposed in Bertola and Caballero (1994) by considering that, besides idiosyncratic ‡uctuations in business conditions, …rms also di¤er with respect to their permanent technological productivity. These transitory and permanent di¤erences explain why some …rms decide to enter the market while others prefer to remain inactive. Accordingly the equilibrium exhibits both …rm and job turnover.
The distinction between the extensive and intensive margin has allowed us to generate some novel results compared with the literature, especially models based on the "one…rm-one-worker" assumption. Most importantly, the model illustrates how the interactions between labor and product market regulation crucially depend on the link between both margins of adjustment. We …nd that …ring costs are quantitatively most important for the hiring and …ring margin whereas …xed and set-up cost matter more for the entry and exit margin. Nevertheless, both policies also matter for the respective other margin. Strikingly enough, the e¤ects of …ring restrictions on the intensive and extensive margin are of opposite signs: they reduce job turnover and amplify …rm turnover. Conversely, job turnover is stimulated by administrative regulations and to a lesser extent by barriers to entry.
These countervailing e¤ects call for a joint analysis of regulation in empirical work, as their interactions may explain why empirical studies using cross-country ‡ow data have failed to document the strong negative relationship between EPL and job ‡ows predicted by the theory. Given that both regulations are strongly positively correlated, if PMR stimulates job reallocation, the negative impact of EPL needs not be evident in cross-country data.
The model also has some clear predictions about the design of regulation policies. Fixed and set-up costs interact negatively by reducing both the incentives to enter the market and the capacity of potential entrants to do so. High …ring costs and low set-up costs complement each other because the bankruptcy option is a pro…table alternative to paying the …ring costs for …rms with low permanent productivity. This motivates why EPL is not applied to small …rms in countries with strict employment protection legislation. Productive incumbent …rms, however, bene…t from higher set-up costs since fewer …rms produce in equilibrium whether or not the positive relationship between job turnover and PMR can be documented in the data.
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which reduces the congestion externality. Thus, if a government wants to introduce …ring costs, it could "buy" the support of these …rms by compensating them with entry barriers.
Overall, our results suggest that considering interactions between product and labor market regulation is important for policy design as well as for understanding the di¤erent labor market outcomes across countries.
The proposed framework lends itself naturally to many extensions. In ongoing research 
where the Poisson hazard of …nding a job is q( ); and W e is the expected asset value of being matched to one of the posted vacancies. This expected value depends on the realized distribution of posted vacancies. Note that W u by de…nition is independent of the type of …rm i. The value of being in a bad job is
where n has been set to one since only "labor-hoarding" …rms employ workers in the bad state. The asset value of employment in a good …rm which has been periods in the good state is
where is the exogenous Poisson hazard of a bad shock. As shown in BC, p. 441-442, nonenforceability of long-term contracts implies that the asset value of a worker in a …rm with low productivity " b is equal to the outside option W u (…rms can credibly threaten workers to …re them otherwise). Thus, W b is also independent of …rm-speci…c productivity a i since unemployed workers and workers in …rms with temporarily low productivity have the same expected discounted utility. Equation (A2) implies that the wage in the bad state w b i will absorb di¤erences in W g;1 i (0).
Wage determination.
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining between the worker and the …rm. Nonenforceability of contracts implies that all workers in a given …rm earn the same wage.
However, wages between …rms di¤er as long as workers have some bargaining power, > 0.
Wages di¤er for …rms in the good state depending on the time they have spend in the good state and the number of workers they have hired in this time. As is standard the Nash bargain implies that
where the shadow value of posting a vacancy S o is zero (the shadow value of hiring a worker equals the ‡ow cost of posting the vacancy discounted by the probability that the vacancy is matched to a worker).
Plugging the shadow value of hiring a worker (6) into the optimality condition of the Nash bargain (A4), we get
and thus
where dots denote time derivatives. The outside option of workers does not change as …rms experience good times, but the number of posted vacancies does. Inserting these two expressions into (A3), we get
Wages of "non-permanent" …rms. Reinserting the explicit expression for the shadow value of a hired worker (7) into (A6) yields
Making explicit the dependence of wages on employment w
we …nd that the following condition must hold 
Wages in good …rms are a weighted average of the workers outside option and the …rm's surplus net of expected …ring costs.
Optimal labor demand schedules. Note the incentive of …rms to reduce the surplus appropriated by workers by increasing employment. This incentive is stronger the larger is and .
By de…nition
Reinserting this expression into (7) and (9), di¤erentiating with respect to , we get 
Initial vacancy posting of "labor hoarding" …rms. For these …rms, l i (0) di¤ers from zero so we need to determine two boundary conditions. Equation (8) 
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As before, the second boundary condition follows from equating (A8) and (A12) using (A10):
(1 ) rW u + Output and Welfare.
Each …rm in the good state has a "production-equivalent" ‡ow 
